Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials for Males and Females in Vietnam by Nguyen Danh, Hoang Long
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials
for Males and Females in Vietnam
Hoang Long Nguyen Danh
2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6738/
MPRA Paper No. 6738, posted 14. January 2008 15:50 UTC
PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR WAGE 
DIFFERENTIALS FOR MALES AND FEMALES IN 
VIETNAM 
 
 
 
NGUYEN DANH HOANG LONG 
VIETNAM-NETHERLANDS PROJECT FOR MASTER DEGREE ON 
ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HANOI, JUN 2006 
 
ABSTRACT 
Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials for Males and Females in Vietnam* 
 
This study examines public administration-private wage differentials and SOEs-
private wage differentials for males and females. Based on data from Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey in 2002 (VLSS 2002), wage equations with and without selectivity 
correction are estimated by sector of employment for males and females. From these 
results, the study compares the wage structure by sector of work for males and females. 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the public administration-private sector wage 
differentials and the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)-private sector wage differentials are 
carried out. Results, which are controlled for observed characteristics and selection bias, 
indicate some main points. For men, public workers are paid lower than private workers. 
For women, public administration wages are lower than private wages. However, SOE 
wages are higher than private wages for women. The wage differential is mostly due to the 
differential in characteristics in which public workers have richer characteristics than 
private workers. In these worker characteristics, education is the most important element 
accounting for wage differentials. Besides, there are differences in returns to characteristics 
by sector of work for men and for women. Furthermore, the total unexplained differential 
has a large contribution of the wage differential in the constant term of public 
administration vs. private sector and SOE vs. private sector for men and women. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Vietnamese labor market has many changes on the process of restructure 
economic system toward a market economy. Therefore, there are several considerations to 
examine public and private wage differentials.  
The minimum monthly salary in the public sectors, which are paid from the state 
budget and it is only marginal effective given the apparent reluctance to enforce this or any 
other labor regulation (Moock et al, 2003), increased two times, in 2000 and in 2001 (from 
VND 144,000 to VND 180,000 and to VND 210,000). The share of Wages & Salaries 
(including government pensions) in total expenditure fluctuated between 27 and 33 per cent 
of total expenditure (43 and 48 per cent of recurrent expenditure), between 1997 and 2002 
(World Bank, 2005). It is interesting to examine the size of the public-private wage 
differentials.  
In Vietnam, there is a development of multi-sector in economy and public sector 
downsizing. Particularly, there is an expansion of the private sector and reallocation of 
labor from the public sectors to the private sector (Rama, 2001). In addition, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are on the privatized or reformed process. In this process, many workers 
lose job or take early retirement (Rama, 2001). Evidence suggests that women are more 
likely to leave the state sector than men (Rama, 2001). Thus, information of public-private 
wage gap is important to implement SOEs reform. This information will provide a guide in 
wage payment for workers.  
The wage differentials may have significant consequences. According to Adamchik 
and Bedi (2000), if the public sectors underpaid in comparison with the private sectors, 
particularly, wage differentials are large. The wage differentials may lead to inefficiency in 
the public sectors such as moonlighting activities. Furthermore, the wage gap makes 
difficult for the public sector to retain and attract workers. Particularly, young men and 
women to avoid occupations concentrated in the public sector such as medical doctors, 
teachers and researchers (Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2003). However, higher private sector 
wages might have spillovers effects on the public sector wage with negative consequences 
on its fiscal position (Adamchik and Bedi, 2000). 
There are some papers to examine public-private sectors wage differentials in 
Vietnam. Wage differentials exist between the public and private sectors. However, these 
previous evidence on public-private wage differentials is not in comparison of private 
sector to public administration and to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for males and 
females.  
 1
This paper will examine public administration-private sector wage differentials and 
SOEs-private sector wage differentials for males and females from Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey in 2002 (VLSS 2002), which conducted by World Bank (WB) and the 
General Statistic Office (GSO) of Vietnam. The survey provides detailed information about 
employment, income, education, and demographic characteristics of household members. 
The sample of this analysis is confined to wage earners who worked in the 12 months prior 
to the survey and in labor force, that employees are aged between 15 and 60 years. The 
wage earners are in three sectors, the public administration, the SOEs, and the private 
sector. 
The paper includes four main works. Firstly, it is to introduce a general framework of 
public-private wage differentials that bases on theoretical considerations and a brief of 
relevant literatures on public-private sector wage differentials for males and females. 
Secondly, it is to provide an overview public-private sectors wage comparisons in Vietnam. 
Thirdly, it is to estimate wage equations, which include with and without using results of a 
multinomial sector of work choice model, for males and females by sector of work (public 
administration, SOEs and private sector), focusing on differences in returns to worker’s 
characteristics. Then, I decompose the wage differentials, which are the private sector to 
compare with the SOE sector or public administration sector, in order to measure the 
relative contribution of worker’s characteristics to the wage differentials for sector of work 
by gender. From decomposition results, I have contribution of components in the observed 
wage differentials. Finally, the paper provides policy implications to reduce wage 
differentials. 
The paper is to address main question are as follow. Are public workers, who work in 
the public administration or the SOEs, underpaid in comparison with their private sector 
counterparts for males and females? These sub-questions include as what determines 
individuals’ choice among sectors of work (public administration, SOEs and private 
sector)? Are there any differences in relationship wage and wage determining factors by 
sectors of work for males? Are there any differences in relationship wage and wage 
determining factors by sectors of work for females? What factors contribute to the public-
private wage differentials for males and females? Which policies should be recommended 
in order to reduce wage differentials between the public and private sectors?  
The paper is organized as follow: section 2 introduces theoretical considerations and a 
brief of relevant literatures on public-private sector wage differentials for males and 
females; section 3 provides methodological framework; section 4 provides an overview 
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public-private sector wage comparisons in Vietnam; section 5 presents estimation results of 
wage equations for sector of work and by gender. Then, wage differentials, which are the 
private sector to compare with the SOEs or the public administration sector, decompose 
into relevant factors; section 6 gives conclusions and policy implications of the results. 
  
2. THEORETICAL REVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
In explanation for wage differentials, the study has Adam Smith’s view on equalizing 
differences and basic human capital theory, which explains wage differentials as a result of 
difference in schooling and on the job training. Besides, we have institutional views on 
wage differentials. 
In the human capital theory, wage determination has based on the marginal 
productivity theory of which labor capital theory is an extension. The marginal productivity 
of a worker is determined by her/his human capital. Under competitive condition and 
perfect labor movement, wage differentials come from differences in human capital such as 
education, on the job training. It is noted that more human capital will increase marginal 
product of a worker or, on other hand, higher productivity, and then higher wages. 
However, the institutional economists argue that one’s productivity and wage depend 
on many factors such as unions and collective bargaining rendered orthodox wage theory 
unrealistic. 
Many empirical studies have used the human capital framework to analyze the wage 
between public and private sectors for male and female workers. In developed countries, 
some papers have been done in Canada (Gunderson, 1979), in Spain (Lassibille, 1998), and 
in Scotland (Heitmueller, 2004). Recently, this issue has been done in developing countries, 
in Haiti (Terrell, 1993), in Turkey (Tansel, 2004), and in India (Glinskaya and Lokshin, 
2005). Particularly, some studies addressed for some transition economies. They are in 
Poland (Adamchik and Bedi, 2000), in Yugoslavia (Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2003) and in 
Bulgaria (Falaris, 2004). In Vietnam, a study based on Vietnam Living Standards Survey 
1997-1998 to analyze wage differentials between the public and private sectors by Ha 
(2000). From these empirical results, there are wage differentials between the public sectors 
and the private sectors. Moreover, the public-private sector wage differentials for men and 
women are different. In some countries, the public and private wage differentials for men 
are larger than for women. Conversely, in some countries, the public and private wage 
differentials are smaller for men. In Vietnam, the public wages are 44 and 19 per cent lower 
than private wages (taking public and private wage structure, respectively). In addition, 
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Neumark decomposition estimates that public workers earn 32 per cent less that private 
workers do. 
3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Wage equations 
Wage regression models are estimated as augmented Mincerian earnings equations 
controlling for human capital and various other characteristics. 
0j j j jLnW X u jβ β= + +                                                                                                  (3.1) 
where: 
jLnW  is the natural logarithm of hourly wage, 0β is the intercept term, β is a parameter 
vector, X is a vector of individual characteristics including education, potential labor 
experience and can be extended with other exogenous variables measuring personal 
characteristics, and (u) is a random disturbance term. It assumed that (u) is normally 
distributed with constant variance and its mean equals zero. j stands for public 
administration, the SOEs, or private sector. The wage equations are estimated for the public 
administration, the SOEs, and the private sector. 
To correct for selectivity bias, which ordinary least square (OLS) may not be 
consistent because of non-randomness of the sample, we deal with by using the two-stage 
approach of Hay (1980). This two-stage approach is a generalization of Heckman’s two-
stage approach (1979) (Hill, 1983; Liu, 2001). 
In the first stage, we estimate the sector of employment choice model by the logit 
maximum likelihood method. From this multinomial logit model, we have the predicted 
probability of individual i being in one sector j, Pij, for calculating correction term, lambda, 
ijλ . In the second stage, the correction term, lambda, is added into wage equation as a 
regressor.  
Wage equations with selectivity correction estimate by OLS:  
0j j j j j jLnW X vjβ β θ λ= + + +                                                                        (3.2) 
In the employment sector choice model, an individual’s choice of sector of 
employment is commonly presented in terms of utility maximization and human capital 
(Linskaya and Lokshin, 2005). To choose between the sectors, an individual compares 
expected net benefit in each sector and selects the job that best rewards his individual set of 
characteristics. After deciding the sector which to seek a job, the probability of worker are 
selected in the sector that depends on the individual’s characteristics. Worker’s tastes and 
preferences as well as human capital and other characteristics will determine the sectoral 
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choice (Tansel, 2004). In the sectoral choice model, the study assumes that any individual 
faces three mutually exclusive choices: public administration wage employment (j=1), SOE 
wage employment (j=2), private sector wage employment (j=3). The private sector 
employment (j=3) is taken as the base category and other two sets are estimated relative to 
this base category in multinomial logit model. 
Decomposition of public and private wage differentials 
I apply a Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973), and Idson and Feaster (1990)1 wage 
decomposition to the public-private wage differentials for men and women. This wage 
decomposition includes difference due to selectivity bias. This decomposition has been 
used in some studies of pubic-private sector wage differentials for men and women (e.g. 
Terrell (1993) for Haiti; Gerard Lassibille (1998) for Spain; Tansel (2004) for Turkey). 
Comparisons of wages between the public administration and the private sector may 
be decomposed as: 
1 3 01 03 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 3ln ln ( ) 0.5( )( ) 0.5( )( ) ( )W W X X X Xβ β β β β β θ λ θ− = − + + − + + − + − λ  
(3.3a) 
Decomposition of wage between the SOEs and the private sector follows as: 
2 3 02 03 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 3ln ln ( ) 0.5( )( ) 0.5( )( ) ( )W W X X X Xβ β β β β β θ λ θ− = − + + − + + − + − λ  
(3.3b) 
where lnW  refers to the mean LnW, the mean of the natural logarithm of hourly 
wage ; X vectors are mean values over the individuals in a particular sector of employment, 
β are coefficients of X, λ  denotes the mean of λ , selection term, θ  are the coefficients of 
the selection terms in the wage equations, the subscript (3) refers to the private sector, the 
subscript (1) refers to the public administration, the subscript (2) refers to the SOE sector. 
This decomposition shows four sources of the wage differentials in the mean of Ln 
(wage) in the private sector to compare with the state-owned enterprise sector or public 
administration sector. The four sources are (a) differences in constant terms, (b) differences 
in endowments of workers, (c) differences in the coefficients, and (d) selectivity bias. In 
this decomposition, the non-discriminatory wage structure lies midway between public 
wage structure and private wage structure or equal weights are assigned to the public and 
private sectors. 
01 03( )β β− ; 02 03( )β β−The first component ( ) is the differences in the constant terms. 
This differential can be interpreted as a premium or pure rent from being in a given sector 
                                                 
1 Idson and Feaster (1990) for a decomposition of wage differentials by employer size that account for 
selectivity bias. 
 5
1 3 1 3)( )0.5( X Xβ − ; (Terrell, 1993). The second component ( β + 2 3 2 30.5( )( )X Xβ β+ − ) is 
due to the differences in endowments of the workers (X). The third component 
( 1 3 1 30.5( )( )X X β β+ − ; 2 3 20.5( )(X X 3)β β ) is due to the di rences in the coeffici+ − ffe ents 
or due to differences in the pay structure to the endowments. The fourth component 
( 1 1 3 3( )θ λ θ λ− ; 2 2 3 3( )θ λ θ λ− ) is due to the dif
. DATA 
 carried out by 
atistic Office (GSO) in 2002. 
limited to wage earners who have a wage-earning 
job as
mple has 11813 men, which are 
2208
ferences in the selection terms. The first and 
the third components are often referred to as the unexplained differentials. 
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This study is based on Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS)
General St
This analysis is confined to who were in labor force, that employees are age between 
15 and 60 years2. The sample is further 
 their main activity during the past twelve months.  
The final data sample has 19156 wage earners in three sectors, the public 
administration, the SOEs, and the private sector. This sa
 in the public administration, 1407 in the SOEs, and 8198 in the private sector, and 
7343 women, which are 1920 in the public administration, 1139 in the SOEs, and 4284 in 
the private sector. In the labor market of Vietnam, wage employment made up 30 per cent3 
of total employment in 2002. Thus, the paper relates to about a quarter of the labor force. 
Table 1: Mean characteristics of wage earners in Vietnam, 2002 
 Men Women 
Characteris Private 
Sector 
tics Public 
Administration
SOEs Private 
Sector 
Public 
Administration 
SOEs 
Number of observations 2,208  07 8,198 1,920  4,284 1,4 1,139
5.63  6.29 4.05  6.14  4.94  3.11  Hourly wage rates   
(1000 VND) (6.61) (5.15) (5.51) (9.23) (20.08) (4.38) 
39.04  36.53 30.92 36.35  33.53  29.64 Age 
( ( ( (9.44) ( (9.59) 9.90) 10.23) 10.25) 10.56)
Experience (in years) 19.40  17.86 15.29 16.26  15.56  14.01 
  (9.89) (9.92) ( (10.23) (9.83) (9.87) 10.67)
13.19  11.98 6.16  13.82  10.81  5.32  Years of schooling 
(4.06) (4.26) (4.46) (3.46) (4.68) (4.72) 
Workers in urban (%) 49.73 64.11 26.46 53.7 57.42 29.08 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses     
Source: Author's calculations b VLSS 2002    
                                                
ased on 
 
2 Sixty years of age is chosen as the cut off point for the sample. In Vietnam, the legal retirement age is 60 
years for males and 55 years for females. The legal retirement age may not be effectively implemented 
especially in the private sector. 
3 Source: World Bank (2003), “Vietnam Development Report 2004: Poverty”, Report No. 27130-VN 
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  There are some characteristics of wag  earners in three sectors of employment. 
to w
e
Workers in the private sector are less educated, less experienced background as compared 
orkers in the public sector. Moreover, public administration workers have higher 
schooling years and experience than SOE workers. Table 1 displays the summary statistics 
of workers in three sectors. Mean of hourly wage rate in both public administration and 
SOEs are higher than in private sector. For men, mean of hourly wage of workers in the 
SOEs are the highest (6.29) and the second mean of hourly wage is in the public 
administration. For women, workers in the public administration receive the highest 
average hourly wage rate, 6.14. 4.05 and 3.11 are the average hourly wage rates for workers 
in the private sector, respectively. According to the sample, mean age in both public 
administration and SOEs has higher than in private sector. Mean age in the private sector is 
about 30 years for men and women. In the SOEs, mean age is 36 years for men and 33 
years for women. In the public administration, mean age is 39 years for men and 36 years 
for women. For men and women, workers in the private sector have lowest mean of 
experience in three sectors, 15.29 for men and 14.01 for women in the private sector. 
Moreover, SOE workers are lower mean of experience than public administration workers. 
The wage earners are well educated, especially for a low-income country. Much of 
empirical work in Vietnam agrees with this result (e.g. Moock et al, 2003). The average 
numbers of schooling years converted from the educational attainment. For men and 
women, average of schooling years is above 5 years. Mean schooling years in both the 
public administration and the SOEs are higher than in the private sector. 6.16 for men and 
5.32 for women are mean schooling years in the private sector. In the public administration, 
mean schooling years is 13.19 for men and 13.82 for women. Moreover, mean schooling 
years in the SOEs is lower than in the public administration, 11.98 for men and 10.81 for 
women in the SOEs. For men and women in the public administration, there is a balance of 
proportion of workers in urban and in rural. In the SOEs, proportion of workers in urban are 
higher than in rural, 64.11 per cent for urban men and 57.42 per cent for urban women. In 
the contrary, about 70 per cent of workers in the private sector are in rural. Thus, workers in 
the private sector are less educated, less experienced background as compared to workers in 
the public sector. Moreover, public administration workers have higher schooling years and 
experience than SOE workers. 
5. RESULTS 
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Estimates of selection equations 
able 2: Maximum likelihood multinomial logit estimates of employment sector choice 
 and women, Vietnam, 2002 
T
for men
Men Women 
  A
lic 
stration 
State Owned 
Enterprises 
Public 
dministration 
State Owned 
Enterprises 
Pub
Admini
Variable Coef. P-val oef P-value Coef. P-v ef P-valueue C alue Co
Experience 0.09 00 0 0.08 00 0  39 0.0 .0643 0.000 40 0.0 .0847 0.000
 ( (0 (00.0084)  .0048)  (0.0090)  .0103)  
Experience Square (/1000) -  - - -  0.6720 0.013 0.6644 0.024 0.5971 0.097 1.4662 0.000 
 ( ( ( (  -0.0577)  -0.0529)  -0.0368)  -0.2052)  
Education levels         
Primary 1.3807 0.000 0.8903 0.000 1.2474 0.000 1.1437 0.000 
 (0.1557)  (0.0670)  (0.1469)  (0.1382)  
Lower secondary 2.3233 0.000 1.4174 0.000 2.8068 0.000 1.5570 0.000 
 (0.2971)  (0.0949)  (0.4431)  (0.0672)  
Upper secondary 0.0 0 0.000 0.0 0 0.0 0  3.8602 0 2.4062 4.1260 0 2.1909 0
 (0.5942)  ( (  0.0899)  (0.6499)  -0.0038)  
Vocational/Technica 0. 0 0.000 0. 0 0.0 0 l 5.0973 00 3.6049 6.1478 00 3.4373 0
 (0.6885)  ( (  0.1102)  (0.8016)  -0.0369)  
College and highe 0.0 0 0.000 0.0 0 0.0 0 r 6.5254 0 4.1490 6.7807 0 3.5691 0
 (0.8233)  ( (  0.0254)  (0.8420)  -0.0811)  
Urban location 0.1 4 0.000 0.005 0.0 0 0.0975 7 0.9003 -0.2472 0.4454 0
 ( ((-0.0019)  0.0904)  -0.0472)  (0.0779)  
Regions         
Northeast 1.0105 0.000 0.6710 0.000 1.3275 0.000 0.3856 0.004 
 (0.1148)  (0.0522)  (0.2230)  (-0.0026)  
Northwest 2.7 05 0.000 0.3 0.254 2.8 98 0.000 -0.4262 0.414 1 733 8
 (0.5207)  ( (  -0.0425)  (0.6276)  -0.1563)  
North Central Coas 0.0 0 0.666 0.0 0 0.0 3 t 0.7464 0 0.0564 0.9423 0 0.2684 9
 (0.0906)  (-0.0056)  (0.1524)  (0.0005)  
South Central Coas 0.0 0 0.586 0.0 0 0.5 8 t 0.4620 0 0.0639 0.7247 0 0.0871 2
 (0.0504)  ( (  -0.0001)  (0.1164)  -0.0148)  
Central Highlands 0.000 0.034 0.0 0 0.544  1.0101 0.4088 0.9927 0 -0.1383 
 (0.1295)  ( (  0.0218)  (0.1868)  -0.0574)  
Southeas 0.008 0.1 0 0.0 8 0.0 3 t 0.2974 0.1711 0 0.2060 9 -0.2528 2
 (0.0287)  (0.0124)  (0.0376)  (-0.0430)  
Mekong Delta 0.0 0 0.021 0.0 0 0.000  1.2688 0 -0.2924 0.8290 0 -0.6341 
 (0.1634)  (-0.0407)  (0.1514)  (-0.1119)  
Land area (/1000) 0.0 0 0.000 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0599 0 0.0349 0.0395 0 0.0391 0
 (0.0054)  (0.0025)  (0.0042)  (0.0047)  
Non labor income (/1000) 0.048 0.020 0.123 0.583 0.0076 0.0088 -0.0074 -0.0025 
 ( ( ( (  0.0006)  0.0007)  -0.0009)  -0.0002)  
Constant 0.0 0 0.000 0.000 0.0 0 -6.7781 0 -5.0476 -6.0570 -3.8530 0
Outc o h a uome Private sect r==0 is t e comp rison gro p 
Log-likelihood   hoo  -6632.8     Log-likeli d -4692.7   
LR chi2(34)    L 34  6117.62 R chi2( ) 4627.8 
Pseudo R2 0.3302  0.3156    Pseudo R2 
Number of observation 11813       Number of obs 7343   
NOTE:   Marginal effect is ses; S  append  for de riable in parenthe ee ix scription of va s. 
Source: Author's calculations based on the VLSS 2002 
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 Multinomial logit estimates of sector choice for men and women are shown in Table 
2. The logit coefficients and marginal effect are reported for public administration and 
SOEs. 
 the private sector, 
holding
 significant and increase the probability of joining public administration, and 
SOEs f
ome increases the 
proba
The marginal effects, which are in parentheses, of each variable on the probability of 
joining a particular sector calculated at the mean values of the variables. 
For men and women, experience significantly increases the probability of 
employment in all of the two sectors at a decreasing rate as compared to
 all else constant. However, experience has a different effect across genders. For 
men, experience increases their probability of being employed in the public administration 
that exceeds their probability of being employed in the SOEs; for women, this difference is 
not much. 
Considering the level of education, all levels of educational attainment are 
statistically
or men and women. The higher the educational level, the higher its contribution to 
the participation in the public administration and in the SOEs. For men and women, the 
probability of being employed in the public administration increases with higher levels of 
education. With college and higher degree, the probability of being employed in the public 
administration increases 82.3 per cent for men and 84.2 per cent for women, holding all 
else constant. While, a worker in possession of a primary education degree has a 15.5 per 
cent and 6.7 per cent higher probability of working in the public administration for men and 
women, respectively. Holding everything else constant, the probability of being employed 
in the SOEs also increase with higher levels of education for men, however, this probability 
decrease for women in the level of education such as college and higher degree and 
vocational/technical. With vocational/technical degree, the probability of being employed 
in the SOEs increases 11 per cent for men and decrease 3.6 per cent for women. In addition, 
in all levels of education, a worker with a level of education has a probability of being 
employed in the public administration that exceeds their probability of being employed in 
the SOEs for men and women. Thus, workers with higher experience and education would 
prefer to work in or are more likely to be selected in the public sectors. 
For men, coefficients of the non-labor income are positive and statistically significant 
at the five per cent significance level. It means that non-labor inc
bility of participation in the public sectors. For women, coefficients of the non-labor 
income are statistically insignificant. For men and women, the area of land owned 
significantly increases the probability of participation in the public sectors. 
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In addition, individuals living in urban location are more likely to be employed in the 
SOEs for men and women. Other things being equal, urban location decreases the 
proba
 River Delta. However, the 
proba
have results of a series of Chow test4 on the equality of the slope coefficients in the 
administration, in the private sector and the SOEs, and the 
publi
h5 to drop out insignificant 
varia
 calculating [exp(b)-1], where b is the corresponding 
regre
and with selectivity correction for men in Table 3, 
e public administration and the private sector, 
                                                
bility of working in the public administration for women. 
As for regional factor, for men and women, the probabilities of working in the public 
administration are higher in all regions as compared to the Red
bilities of working in the SOEs of some regions are lower as compared to the Red 
River Delta. The probability of working in the SOEs in Mekong Delta is lower than in Red 
River Delta for men. Besides, for women, the probabilities of working in the SOEs in 
Northwest, Central Highlands, Southeast, and Mekong Delta are lower than Red River 
Delta. 
Estimates of wage equation  
I 
private sector and the public 
c administration and the SOEs for men and women, indicating that the underlying 
wage determination process is different in these two sectors.  
Results of wage equation without and with selectivity correction are optimum 
regressions that have been used by the top-down approac
bles at 10 per cent level of significance. Besides, White’s standard errors are used to 
provide asymptotically consistent values in the empirical work for wage equations with and 
without selectivity correction.  
From results of wage equations, as the wage model is semi logarithmic, the effect of a 
dummy variable is measured
ssion coefficient (Wooldridge, 2003, p.226). This study interprets these coefficients in 
terms of percentage difference. 
Public and private wage equations for men 
Wage equations without 
respectively. The wage equations of both th
 
4 Chow test on equality of the slope coefficients in the wage functions: there is not equality of the slope 
coefficients in the wage function for men and for women, Fcomputed= 24.339109>Fcritical =F0.01(25, 19106)= 
1.773553; For men, there is not a Chow test on equality of the slope coefficients in the private sector and the 
public administration, in the private sector and the SOEs and in the public administration and the SOEs,  
Fcomputed=11.05774905>Fcritical =F0.01(25,10356)= 1.7743886, Fcomputed= 5.6127307>Fcritical =F0.01(24,9557)= 
1.7927919, and Fcomputed= 8.093703962>Fcritical = F0.01 (25,3565)= 1.7778656, respectively. For women, there 
is not a Chow test on equality of the slope coefficients in the private sector and the public administration, 
in the private sector and the SOEs and in the public administration and the SOEs, Fcomputed= 
9.536567289>Fcritical = F0.01 (25,6154)=1.7756347, Fcomputed= 5.6819969>Fcritical = F0.01 (24,5375)= 1.794322, 
and Fcomputed= 4.068899902>Fcritical = F0.01 (25,3009)= 1.7788457, respectively. 
5 Gujarati, D.N. (1995) Basic Econometrics, 3rd edition, Mc Graw Hill, Inn; The results of optimum wage 
equations are estimated by stepwise method in the Stata software. 
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which
election Corrected for selection
 have selection term is statistically insignificant, have not change coefficients in 
comparison with the wage equations without selection term. Coefficient estimate of the 
selection term in the SOEs is statistically significant. 
Table 3: Wage equations of men, Vietnam, 2002 
 Not corrected for s
Public 
Administration
State Owned 
Enterprises 
Private sector State Owned 
Enterprises   
Variable Coef. Per f. Per cent  cent Coef. Per cent Coe Coef. Per cent 
          
Experience 0. 0.0298 3.0 0.0324 0.0437 4.4 0318 3.2 3.2 
Experience Square (/1000) -  - - -  0.8163 -81.6 0.5744 -57.4 0.6364 -63.6 0.5771 -57.7 
Education levels          
Primary     0.1145 12.1    
Lower secondary   0.1240 13.2 0.1216 12.9 0.1616 17.5 
Upper secondary 0.2 31.5 0.1 21.4 0.2 29.3 0.2 30.3 736 943 573 649 
Vocational/T 0.3 05 40.6 0.3 35.9 0.4 51.1 echnical 4 067 0.3292 39.0 128 
C 0.5 80.8 ollege and higher 924 0.6006 82.3 0.7652 114.9 0.6816 97.7 
Urban location 0.1493 16.1 0.2104 23.4 0.1032 10.9 0.2643 30.2 
Regions          
Northeast -0.0567 -5.5   -0.0751 -7.2    
Northwest   -0.2760 -24.1 -0.5251 -40.8 -0.3502 -29.5 
North Central Coast -0.1766 -16.2 -0.1944 -17.7     
South Central Coast     0.1575 17.1    
Central 0.1 11.8  Highlands 116 -0.1710 -15.7   -0.1837 -16.8 
Southeast   0.2931 34.1 0.2653 30 4 . 0.2901 33.7 
Mekong Delta   0.2 27.3 0.1 20.2 412 0.2516 28.6 840 
Professions          
Professionals 0.2 1 33.8 /technical 91   0.3797 46.2    
Clerical and related     0.1586 17.2    
Sales and service workers -0.3538 -29.8 -0.3201 -27.4 -0.1181 -11.1 -0.3185 -27.3 
Agriculture   -0.2529 -2 3 -0.2571 -22.7 2. -0.1492 -13.9 
Craft workers 0.2 22.5 -0.1038 -9.9 -0.1045 -9.9 028   
Operators 0.4849 62.4 0.1396 15.0 0.2337 26.3 0.1405 15.1 
A 0.3 40.9 rmed forces 432        
Unclassified   -0.1942 -17.7 -0.1289 -1 1 2. -0.1942 -17.7 
Selection term       -0.1709  
Constant 0.9 0.7 0.60.4375   019   005   417   
 
0.1934                      0.3222
87.74           
 
R-squared   17              0.3               
s                                
umber of observations      2208                    1407 198                        1407 
            36.65 
                          0.30   206  
F-statistic   77.6              38.56 
N 8
Source: Author's calculations based on the VLSS 2002  
 
Linear and quadratic terms in experience have t d negative 
signs respectively in three sectors for men. The estimates of return to education are 
positive. The wage return to education increases with higher level of education. In the 
he expected positive an
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SOEs
ient estimates of the selection term in the private 
uations of both the public administration and 
the S
, returns to education in the wage equation with selectivity correction are higher than 
one in the wage equation without selectivity correction. Workers in urban area are 
advantage in three sectors. The largest advantage is in the SOEs. Some regional wage 
differentials are in both the SOEs and the private sector but not for male workers in the 
public administration. The SOEs and the private sector pay workers in Red River Delta 
lower than workers with the same qualifications in Southeast and Mekong Delta. In general, 
managers receive higher in wage than other professions. Coefficient of selection term is 
negative for men in the SOEs. This means that there is a negative correlation between the 
unobserved factors in the sector selection and wages in each sector. In other words, 
unobserved characteristics that increase the probability of SOE employment also have a 
negative impact on SOE wage for men.  
Public and private wage equations for women 
Wage equations without and with selectivity correction for women in Table 5.3, 
respectively. As we can see, the coeffic
sector are statistically significant. The wage eq
OEs, which have selection term is statistically insignificant, have not change 
coefficients in comparison with the wage equations without selection term. Table 5.3 shows 
that linear and quadratic terms in experience have the expected positive and negative signs 
respectively in three sectors for women. The estimates of return to education are positive. 
The wage return to education increases with higher level of education. In the private sector, 
return to education in the wage equation with selectivity correction is higher than one in the 
wage equation without selectivity correction. Similar to men, female workers in urban area 
are advantage in three sectors. Workers in North regions (Red River Delta, Northeast, 
Northwest, and North Central Coast) receive lower wages than ones in South regions 
(Mekong Delta and Southeast). The wage returns to region are different in each of sector. In 
the private sector, managers receive the highest wages. Coefficient of selection term is 
positive for women in the private sector. This implies that, there is a positive correlation 
between the unobserved factors in the sector selection and wages in each sector. In other 
words, for women, unobserved characteristics that increase probability of private sector 
employment have a positive impact on private sector wages. 
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Table 4: Wage equations of women, Vietnam, 2002 
Not corrected for selection Corrected for selection  
  
 
Private Sector Public 
Administration
State Owned 
Enterprises 
Private Sector
Variable Coef. Pe . Per cent r cent Coef. Per cent Coef Coef. Per cent 
         
Experience 0. 0.0180 1.8 0.0210 2.1 0.0459 4.6 0142 1.4 
Experience Square (/1000) - - -  0.7560 -75.6   0.4399 -44.0 0.4859 -48.6 
Education level         
Primary   0.1408 15.1 0.0720 7.5 0.0993 10.4 
Lower secondary   0.2995 34.9 0.1177 12.5 0.1774 19.4 
Upper secondary 0.1 12 14.0 0.3 13 42.1 0.3 42.4 0.4 15 58.6 3 5 535 6
Vocational/T .2 90 34.9 echnical 0 9 0.5370 71.1 0.2629 30.1 0.5260 69.2 
C .5 65 69.3 ollege and higher 0 2 0.9417 156.4 0.8146 125.8 1.0794 194.3 
Urban location 0.0792 8.2 0.0726 7.5 0.1236 13.2 0.1258 13.4 
ons         
Northeast         
Regi
Northwest     -0.3813 -31.7 -0.3088 -26.6 
North Central Coast -0.1706 -15.7       
South Cen .0 30 9.7 0.1 26 11.9 0.2 26.7 0.2 71 26.8 tral Coast 0 9 1 369 3
Central .1 21.0 0.2 88 29   Highlands 0 904 5 .5 0.1816 19.9 0.1877 20.6 
Southeast 0.1 3 17.0 0.3 3 47.1 0.3742 45.4 57 0.2821 32.6 86
Mekong Delta 0.1301 13.9 0.3724 45.1 0.3366 40.0 0.3269 38.7 
Professions         
Professionals/technical 0.2752 31.7       
Clerical and related  0.0       
Sales and service workers -0.3218 -27.5 -0.2246 -20.1 -0.2285 -20.4   
Agriculture     -0.2524 -2 3 -0.2471 -21.9 2.
Craft workers   -0.1357 -12.7 -0.2865 -24.9 -0.2854 -24.8 
Operators   0.2 60 25  2 .4     
A .4 63.5 rmed forces 0 914       
Unclassified -0.1519 -14.1 -0.1775 -16.3 -0.3447 -29.2 -0.3415 -28.9 
Selection 0.2 05 term       6  
Constant 0.63  0.7      0.6913  0.4067  18 017
 
R-squared                0.3187 
s                                
umber of observations      1920                   1139 
0.1              
      
284                       4284 
                         0.2465    
F-statistic  44.52             41.59 
N
 
813       0.1823 
41.38                39.67 
4
Source: Author's calculations based on the VLSS 2002 
 
 
Comparisons of returns to characteristics across wage equations 
Based on the results of wage equation with selectivity correction, I have some 
or men and women. 
Comp
r. 
e higher than in the private 
sector, except level of college and higher degree. Holding other things constant, urban 
comparisons of returns to characteristics on sectoral wage structures f
arisons of public administration-private returns for men 
Returns to experience in the public administration are higher than the private secto
The wage returns to education in the public administration ar
 13
work
r degree. Similar to urban workers in the public administration, return to 
 is higher than in the private sector, 10.9 per 
cent, 
e public administration than the private sector. 
inistration receive lower 
return
 and college and higher degree in the SOEs are lower than the private 
rban area in the SOEs is lower than the 
priva
 wage differentials. The 
 for men and in the private sector for 
wom
 
ers in the public administration receive higher wages than ones in the private sector. In 
returns to profession, some professions in the public administration have lower wage 
returns than in the private sector such as Professionals/technical and related and Sales and 
service workers. 
Comparisons of SOEs-private returns for men 
The wage returns to education in the SOEs are higher than the private sector, except 
college and highe
urban workers is 30.2 per cent in the SOEs that
other things being equal. In the worker’s residence, workers in Southern regions 
(Southeast and Mekong Delta) are high returns in both the SOEs and the private sector. 
Manager is reference profession and holding other things constant, returns to profession are 
lower in the SOEs than the private sector. 
Comparisons of public administration-private returns for women 
Return to experience is higher in the public administration than the private sector. The 
wage returns to education are lower in th
Holding other thing constant, urban women in the public adm
 than in the private sector. Public administration workers in Southern regions (South 
Central Coast, Southeast and Mekong Delta) have lower wage returns than in the private 
sector. Sales and service workers in the public administration receive lower return than in 
the private sector. 
Comparisons of SOEs-private returns for women 
Return to experience is lower in the SOEs than in the private sector. Besides, returns 
to upper secondary
sector. Holding other thing constant, return to u
te sector. Workers in Southern regions (South Central Coast, Southeast and Mekong 
Delta) are high favorable in both the SOEs and the private sector. South Central Coast and 
Southeast are lower returns in the SOEs than the private sector. 
Decomposition of public-private wage differentials 
We have results of wage decomposition for men and women, which are public 
administration-private wage differentials and SOEs-private
coefficient estimates of the selection term in the SOEs
en are statistically significant. 
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Decomposition of wage gaps for men 
 
Table 5: Decomposition of sector wage gaps with selectivity correction for men, 
Vietnam, 2002 
Wage differentials between 
public administration and 
Wage differentials 
between state owned 
sector workers 
private sector workers enterprises and private 
 ap apGap value % of total g Gap value % of total g
0.5171 163 0.3925 85 Characteristics gap 
Experience 0.0524 16 0.0320 7 
Education   0.2882 91 0.2243 48 
Urban location 0.0294 9 15 0.0692 
Region -0.0378 -12 -0.0465 -10 
Profession 0.1849 58 0.1136 24 
Return gap 0.0471 15 -0.0274 -6 
Experience 0.1688 53 0.0661 14 
Education -0.0770 -24 -0.0102 -2 
Urban location 0.0175 6 0.0729 16 
Region -0.0992 -31 -0.0346 -7 
Profession 0.0369 12 -0.1216 -26 
Environment gap -0.2630 -83 -0.0587 -13 
  0.1571  Selectivity 
Total unexplained differential -0.2159  -0.0861  
      
Total wage gap 0.3174 100 0.4635 100 
NOTE: Total unexpl ntia  of return gap and en  gap;  ained differe l is the sum vironment
             Total wage gap is sum of characteristic gap, return gap, and e t gap 
d o 002 
ion between pub istration private for me
xplained difference of 24 per cent. In other 
ords, public administration wages are 24 per cent lower than private wages. Besides, 
per cent to 
the to
nvironmen
Source: Author's calculations base n VLSS 2
 
Wage decomposit lic admin  and  sectors n 
In the results of decomposition of public administration-private wage differentials 
for men in Table 5, the study estimates an une
w
wage differential is mostly due to the differential in characteristics, which is 163 
tal gap. It can be said that on average male workers in the public administration have 
richer characteristics than ones in the private sector. Education is the most important 
element accounting for wage differentials because the differential in education is large in 
the differential in characteristics. 
Furthermore, for men, differential in the characteristic indicate higher returns to 
worker characteristics in the public administration than in the private sector. Indeed, the 
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wage returns to education in the public administration are higher than the private sector, 
except level of college and higher degree. Returns to experience in the public 
admi
than private wages. Besides, wage differential is mostly due to the 
ap. It can be said that on 
avera
e sector, except college and higher degree. In addition, 
the w
nistration are higher than the private sector. Urban workers in the public 
administration receive higher return than ones in the private sector, holding other things 
constant. In returns to profession, some professions in the public administration have lower 
wage returns than in the private sector such as Professionals/technical and related and Sales 
and service workers. 
Wage decomposition between SOEs and private sectors for men 
In the results of decomposition of SOEs-private wage differentials for men in Table 
5, the study estimates an unexplained difference of 9 per cent. In other words, SOE wages 
are 9 per cent lower 
differential in characteristics, which is 85 per cent to the total g
ge male workers in the SOEs have richer characteristics than ones in the private 
sector. In the differential in characteristics, education is the most important element 
accounting for wage differentials.  
For men, differential in the characteristic indicate higher returns to worker 
characteristics in the SOEs than in the private sector. In particularly, returns to experience 
in the SOEs are higher wages than the private sector. The wage returns to education in the 
SOEs are higher than in the privat
age return to urban area in the SOEs is higher than in the private sector. 
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 Decomposition of sector wage gaps for women 
Table 6: Decomposition of sector wage gaps with selectivity correction for 
women, Vietnam, 2002 
 
Wage differentials Wage differentials 
between state owned 
 
sector workers 
between public 
administration and 
private sector workers 
enterprises and private
 ap apGap value % of total g Gap value % of total g
Characteristics gap 3  0.6405 11 0.3079 68
Experience 8  0.0437 0.0201 4 
Education 0.3780 67 0.2573 56 
Urban location 6  0.0252 4 0.0281 
Region -0.0858 -15 -0.0974 -21 
Profession 0.2794 49 0.0998 22 
Return gap 0.1535 27 0.1481 33 
Experience 0.2868 50 0.0577 13 
Education -0.2257 -40 0.0095 2 
Urban location -0.0193 -3 -0.0230 -5 
Region -0.0995 -18 -0.0314 -7 
Profession 0.2113 37 0.1353 30 
Environment gap -0.2846 -50 -0.0595 -13 
0.0590  0.0590  Selectivity 
Total unexplained differential -0.1311  0.0887  
      
Total wage gap 0.5683 1  00 0.4555 100 
NOTE: Total unexplain  of return gap and nt gap;ed differential is the sum environme   
             Total wage gap is sum of characteristic gap, return gap, and ent gap 
d o 002 
ion between publ istration and private sectors for women 
differentials 
 unexplained difference of 14 per cent. In 
ther words, public administration wages are 14 per cent lower than private wages. Besides, 
 cent to 
the to
 environm
Source: Author's calculations base n VLSS 2
 
Wage decomposit ic admin
In the results of decomposition of public administration-private wage 
for women in Table 6, the study estimates an
o
wage differential is mostly due to the differential in characteristics, which is 113 per
tal gap. It can be said that on average female workers in the public administration 
have richer characteristics than ones in the private sector. In the differential in 
characteristics, education is the most important element accounting for wage differentials. 
Particularly, for women, return to experience is higher in the public administration 
than the private sector. However, the wage returns to education are lower in the public 
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administration than the private sector. Holding other thing constant, urban women in the 
public administration receive lower return than in the private sector. 
Wage
 is mostly due to the 
. It can be said that on 
avera
n the private sector. 
or premium (surplus) that workers 
receiv
r 
inistration wages are 14 per cent 
lower than private wages. However, SOE wages are 9.2 per cent higher than private wages 
for w
 
 decomposition between SOEs and private sectors for women 
In the results of decomposition of SOEs-private wage differentials for women in 
Table 6, unexplained difference is positive, 9.2 per cent. In other words, SOE wages are 
9.2 per cent higher than private wages. Besides, wage differential
differential in characteristics, which is 68 per cent to the total gap
ge female workers in the SOEs have richer characteristics than ones in the private 
sector. In the differential in characteristics, education is the most important element 
accounting for wage differentials. 
Particularly, for women, the wage return to experience in the SOEs is lower than the 
private sector and the wage returns to education in the SOEs are higher than the private 
sector, except levels of upper secondary and college and higher degree. Return to urban 
area in the SOEs is lower wage tha
From results of wage decomposition of men and women in Table 5 and in Table 6, the 
differential in the constant term (environment gap) has large portion in the total 
unexplained differential of public administration vs. private sector and SOEs vs. private 
sector. The constant term reflects the economic rent 
e in the public sectors (Lindauer and Sabot, 1983; Terrell, 1993). Negative premium 
gives that the public sectors paying lower wages than the private sector. Particularly, the 
differential of constant term (environment gap) of public administration vs. private sector is 
larger than the differential of constant term of SOE vs. private sector for men and women. 
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
There are some conclusions follow as: 
For men, public workers are paid lower than private workers because public 
administration wages are 24 per cent lower than private wages and SOE wages are 9 pe
cent lower than private wages. For women, public adm
omen. 
For men and women, public-private wage differential is mostly due to the differential 
in characteristics. Public workers have richer characteristics than private workers. In these 
worker characteristics, education is the most important element accounting for wage 
differentials.
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There are differences in returns to characteristics by sector of work for men and for 
women. For men, the differential in the characteristic indicate higher returns to worker 
characteristics in the public sectors (public administration and SOEs) than in the private 
sector. Indeed, the wage returns to education in the public sectors are higher than the 
priva
 the differentials of constant term 
(envi
ally improve the skills of workers 
for th
ing to this study, workers in the private sector are lower 
propo
gree. The government should pay higher wages to male workers and female 
work
te sector, except level of college and higher degree. Returns to experience in the public 
administration are higher than the private sector. In addition, the wage returns to urban area 
in the public sectors are higher than in the private sector. For women, the wage returns to 
education are lower in the public administration than the private sector and the wage returns 
to education are higher in the SOEs than the private sector, except levels of upper 
secondary and college and higher degree. Difference to men, the wage return to urban area 
in the public sectors is lower than the private sector.  
The total unexplained differential has a large contribution of the differential in the 
constant term of public administration vs. private sector and SOE vs. private sector for men 
and women. Negative premium gives that the public sectors paying lower wages than the 
private sector. Particularly, for men and women,
ronment gaps) of public administration vs. private sector are larger than the 
differentials of constant term of SOE vs. private sector. 
According to the conclusion of analyses of public-private wage differentials, main 
policy implications are as follow: 
The government should consider an assistance strategy about training for workers in 
the private sector. These training programs have to actu
e needs of labor market. Moreover, productivity of workers, who have training 
programs, has to improve. Accord
rtion of workers at high education than in the public sectors for men and women and 
the difference in education is one important factor in accounting for public-private wage 
differentials. 
The government can be considered to the current payment system for wage returns to 
education. For men and women at college and higher degree, public wages are lower than 
private wages. The public sector may have difficulty to retain and attract workers at college 
and higher de
ers at college and higher degree in both the public administration and the SOEs to 
motivate high working capacity. Besides, for women, wages for educated workers in the 
public administration should be increased. Paying higher wages will increase the wage bill 
and strain the fiscal position of the public sector. To satisfy public sector efficiency and 
 19
ease the fiscal strain, the government reduces the public sector employment that can be 
continued by the public sector downsizing program such as the privatized or reformed 
process of State-Owned Enterprises. 
Higher return to urban and the Southern regions (Mekong Delta, Southeast) would 
motivate workers to migrate to urban and to the South regions. The government should 
consider wage policy to attract public workers to work in rural and mountainous areas in 
the North (Northeast, Northwest). 
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
he dependent variable 
hourly wage rate, which are regionally 
Price Index (CPI). 
Expe
 is computed as age minus the number of years 
 minus age of starting school  (Experience = age – years of schooling – age of 
starti
ut of school before the age of 15 not being counted 
(Dou
riables measuring the completion of 
 of the indicated levels of education. Education is classified into six levels that 
are b
aracteristics 
 8 dummy variables are used for 9 professions which are Managers, 
Profe
ns of residence are included to control for differentials in 
 market opportunities (Tansel, 2004). Region variable is 
repre
                                                
T
The dependent variable is the natural log of 
adjusted by Consumers’ 
rience 
The years of work experience variable
of schooling
ng-school) (Mincer, 1974). Years of schooling minus six are relevant in Vietnam, 
since school starts at the age of six. 
In this study, work experience has been estimated as the smaller of the above 
expression and (age - 15), years o
gherty et al, 1991). This study set the value6, 15, as the years that one begins his career 
if he has not yet finished the lower secondary school. 
Education 
Education variable is represented by binary va
some or all
elow primary, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, vocational/ technical, and 
college and higher degree. Below primary, which are included no education, is treated as 
the reference group. College and above includes college diploma, bachelors, masters, and 
candidate doctor. Technical is professional secondary school and vocational is technical 
workers. It is expected that higher levels of education will have bigger returns. 
Job characteristics 
Professional variable is represented by binary variables to reflect job ch
difference in wage.
ssionals/technical and related, Clerical and related, Sales and service workers, 
Agriculture, Craft workers, Operators, Armed forces, and Unclassified. The managerial 
category is as a reference group. 
Geographical characteristics 
Dummy variables for regio
cost of living and the labor
sented by binary variables. 8 regions of Vietnam are consisted Red River Delta, 
Northeast, Northwest, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, Central Highlands, 
Southeast, and Mekong Delta. The Red River Delta is as a reference group. Urban location 
 
6  The working age starts from 15 as the definition of Vietnamese General Statistic Office 
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variable is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if a worker is living in urban, it equals 0 if 
otherwise. 
In addition, this study introduces some variables in the multinomial logit equation that 
influence the sector choice but do not influence wages. These variables are: land area 
varia
 an exogenous instrument that belongs in the 
secto
ffect on household desire to work. Non-labor 
incom
                                                
ble (Falaris, 2004; Tansel, 2004; Linskaya and Lokshin, 2005) and non-labor income 
variable (Appleton et al, 1999; Liu, 2001).  
Land area variable: Land area variable is total land area of household, which are 
managed and used. The land variable is as
r of employment equation but not in the wage equations. Such an asset increases the 
potential income of a household exogenously so that it affects the kind of work, this 
individual will do but not the wages earned. 
Non-labor income7: According to data in VLSS 2002, we have non-labor income of 
household, which is available for income e
e of household is corrected for cross-region price index. 
 
7 Non labor income: includes remittance and value of in kind presents from overseas; domestic remittance and 
value of in-kind presents; pension, sickness and one-time job loss allowance; social insurance allowance; 
other income from social insurance; interest of savings, shares, coupon, loans; income from workshop, 
machinery, assets, tool...leasing; others (lottery, charity and support from other organizations…). 
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